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What are the linkages between private sector development, conflict and peace in post-conflict, 
war to peace transitions?  
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1. Overview 
The private sector can both exacerbate drivers of conflict and contribute to peacebuilding in post-
conflict states. Examples of the role that the private sector can play in conflict and peace at the 
macro, meso and micro levels include: 
Macro level 
• There is a general consensus in the literature that illicit trade in natural resources can 
increase in the post-conflict period, due to factors including limited employment 
opportunities for ex-combatants. The research undertaken for this rapid review did not 
uncover any examples of positive transformations of key industries in post-conflict 
situations. 
Meso level 
• Business participation in mediation processes: In Colombia business leaders were 
members of negotiating teams, but their limited involvement meant that they became 
disillusioned with the peace process. 
• Advocating for peace: In a number of countries business leaders have engaged in low-
level shuttle diplomacy between groups in conflict in order to push for peace. The extent 
to which such initiatives have been successful is unclear. 
• Business associations: Such associations have in some cases attempted to contribute 
to peace and stability by lobbying governments. The degree of their success is difficult to 
establish, due to challenges relating to establishing causality. 
Micro level 
• Cross-border trade initiatives: Programmes like ‘Trading for Peace’ in DRC appear to 
have had some positive impact on peace and stability. 
• Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) support: In Afghanistan, 
businesses provided support for DDR by providing employment and training opportunities 
for ex-combatants through the Afghanistan New Beginning Programme. Ex-combatants 
were also provided with support in starting their own businesses. The latter initiative had 
a high failure rate due to factors including the small size of the initial start-up grant and 
most recipients’ limited ability to manage credit. 
• SMEs: SME peacebuilding activities have had some success in contributing to peace 
and stability in post-conflict countries. However, it is difficult to determine to what extent 
these activities are responsible for positive change because causality is hard to establish. 
There is a relatively small body of literature on the role of the private sector in building peace. 
Most of the evidence takes the form or NGO and international organisation reports and 
evaluations. Examples of successful interventions are often dated and evaluations lack rigour. 
Analysis of success factors is also lacking. It is therefore difficult to establish causality between 
many of the initiatives discussed in this report and improvements in peace and stability. There is 
very little literature looking at private sector involvement in peacebuilding in post-conflict Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). The literature reviewed for this study is largely gender blind. 
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2. Macro level 
There is a general consensus in the literature that illicit trade in natural resources increases in 
the post-conflict period, exacerbating potential drivers of conflict and increasing the risk of a 
return to violence. In the absence of successful Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) programmes, which generate employment for ex-combatants, illegal logging and mining, 
for example, continue or even increase. In Liberia ex-combatants continued to control diamond 
and rubber resources, generating illicit income with serious security implications (Brown, 2006, p. 
15). According to one research report, ‘experiences in illegal activities as well as networks 
between state and criminal actors established during wartime are difficult to dismantle’ (Vorrath, 
2014, p. 13).  
In Sierra Leone and Liberia for example, the illicit economy around natural resources in both 
countries persisted, despite new regulations and institution-building after the civil wars. But it also 
adapted to the new state framework and changes in demand, such as a shift from demand from 
Europe to demand from Asia. However, it is noted that the line between licit and illicit trade of 
goods like diamonds, gold and timber in post-conflict Sierra Leone and Liberia was unclear due 
to constant changes in laws and regulating institutions (Vorrath, 2014, p. 24).  
The research undertaken for this report did not uncover any examples of positive transformations 
of key industries in post-conflict situations. 
3. Meso level 
There are some examples of the private sector pushing for peace at the meso level. In 
Mozambique, executives of Lonrho, the Africa-based mining conglomerate, shuttled between 
representatives of the RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) and FRELIMO (Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique) groups (International Alert, 2006, p. 51). In Colombia, business 
leaders held off-the-record meetings with multi-sectoral groups in an attempt to create space for 
developing personal relationships between stakeholders (International Alert, 2006, p. 51).  
There are also examples of business leaders participating in negotiation processes, such as in 
talks between the Colombian Government and FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia). However, in this case central responsibility for the talks was delegated by the 
president to the presidential commissioner, which kept business leaders in the negotiating team 
out of direct negotiations. This ultimately contributed to increasing disaffection with the peace 
process among the business community (International Alert, 2006, p. 48).  
Business associations have also attempted to contribute to peace and stability, such as in Sri 
Lanka and Northern Ireland: 
Sri Lanka 
Two business associations were established in Sri Lanka during the conflict, Sri Lanka First 
(SLF) and the Business for Peace Alliance (BPA). SLF, made up of companies from the garment, 
tea, tourism and freight industries, focused on the political, social and economic development 
costs of war. SLF undertook several activities: 
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• A coalition of business leaders encouraged people to take part in a solidarity 
demonstration, during which people formed a chain across the island through holding 
hands (Killick et al, 2005, p. 11). 
• Raising public awareness about the costs of war and the ways in which peace would 
allow money spent on conflict to be invested back into social and economic 
infrastructure. The messages Sri Lanka First put out in the campaign balanced 
information on the negative costs of the war with positive messages encouraging 
stability. Prior to Sri Lanka’s December 2001 general election, the Sri Lanka First 
campaign placed adverts on TV and in the press, asking the electorate to vote for peace. 
A number of other local organisations also placed such advertisements (Killick et al, 
2005, p. 11). 
• Lobbying all parties in the conflict to come to the negotiation table (Datzberger & 
Denison, 2013, p. 20). 
International Alert claims that this advocacy ‘helped to bring a pro-peace government to power’ 
but it is not clear how and to what extent the lobbying had this effect. This group significantly 
reduced its activities once the ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002 (Datzberger & Denison, 
2013, p. 20). However, when the peace talks broke down, they resumed their efforts to campaign 
for peace and stability (Killick et al, 2005, p. 11). 
The BPA was originally supported by International Alert and the UNDP, with the objectives of 
supporting reconciliation, business-to-business relationships across the ethnic divide and 
regional inclusion in the peace process (Datzberger & Denison, 2013, p. 20). 
The BPA’s objectives during the conflict were: (Killick et al, 2005, p. 15) 
• To generate peace dividends at the local level. 
• To strengthen provincial and inter-provincial economic activity through business 
associations. 
• To persuade policymakers on key issues affecting peace and stability.   
• To practice the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in all alliance 
programmes and activities. 
International Alert reports that the BPA had positive impacts on business relationships between 
Sri Lanka’s 17 regional chambers of commerce. Like the SLF, the BPA lobbied the government, 
but for specific policy outcomes rather than for general peace and stability (Datzberger & 
Denison, 2013, p. 20). 
It is noteworthy that during the conflict the private sector did not have one single hierarchical 
structure of Employer and Business Member Organisations (EMBOs) that supported the 
business community’s attempts to meet conflict-related challenges in an ‘organised and cohesive 
manner.’ Rather, individual EBMOs and their leaders chose how to gather support and contribute 
in different ways (Miriyagalla, 2016, p. 12). 
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Northern Ireland 
The Northern Ireland Confederation of British Industry (CBI) came to the conclusion that any 
improvement in the economic situation in Northern Ireland required them to become strategically 
engaged in the peace process. As the representative of regional businesses and an independent 
non-party organisation, the CBI was reportedly in a good position to lead a private sector peace 
initiative (Killick et al, 2005, p. 12). It helped Northern Ireland work towards peace by operating 
as a policy think tank and as a lobbying group (Killick et al, 2005, p. 12). Details of the extent to 
which CBI had an impact on peace and stability in Northern Ireland were not found during the 
course of this research. 
4. Micro level 
A number of micro level private sector projects and initiatives have attempted to contribute peace 
in post-conflict countries. However, it is not always clear to what extent they have achieved their 
goals due to the absence of thorough evaluations. Examples include: 
Afghanistan New Beginning Programme (ANBP) 
Former militia members were offered the opportunity to start their own business, or to join a 
training or apprenticeship scheme run by NGOs and businesses, in partnership with the ANBP. 
ANBP’s caseworkers were in charge of assisting former combatants in choosing the appropriate 
reintegration package for them.
 
Former combatants were offered opportunities in a range of 
sectors, including agriculture, vocational training and job placement, small business opportunities 
and de-mining (Giustozzi, 2006, p. 217). 
The incentive offered to businesses for engaging in the programme was the opportunity to 
employ DDR trainees for free for 4-12 months. Ex-combatants would be treated like any other 
trainee and supervised by the NGOs that had signed up as implementing partners (Giustozzi, 
2006, p. 217). Early surveys suggested that small to medium-sized construction firms played the 
biggest role in offering opportunities for ex-combatants, followed by small shops (Giustozzi, 
2006, p. 217). 
Ex-combatants who chose to start a business were offered training courses, a small grant of 
USD 700 and ongoing support from caseworkers (Giustozzi, 2006, p. 218). Ex-combatants 
typically opened small grocery shops, which accounted for as many as 70-80% of all businesses 
started. It is estimated that the business failure rate stood at between 60-80%. There are no 
official figures available (Giustozzi, 2006, p. 218). One report suggests that the small size of the 
initial start-up grant and most recipients’ limited ability to manage credit were factors behind the 
high failure rate.  Another possible factor was the overall level of poverty, which reduced the 
purchasing power of the majority of Afghans (Giustozzi, 2006, p. 218). 
Nepal – high-value vegetable value chains 
The UJYALO project, implemented in 13 districts, aimed at integrating the value chain approach 
with psychosocial and peace-building activities. According to one independent evaluation the 
programme increased trust and cooperation within families, in farmers’ groups and between 
neighbours. It also decreased inter-family and inter-community conflict and deterred individuals 
from joining Maoist groups. Improvements in the social status of women, with some women 
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taking lead roles in farmers’ groups have been another impact of the project. It also resulted in an 
increase in women’s mobility and financial independence, with some women earning for the first 
time. However, the long-term effects of these activities were reportedly not assessed because 
only one group in the value chain, farmers, participated in these activities (Datzberger & Denison, 
2013, p. 19).  
Other outcomes of the programme include a reduction in school closures, and the increased 
availability of transportation, development activities, and health facilities. These changes have 
been attributed to a combination of the UJYALO project and political change in Nepal 
(Baneshwor, 2007, p. vi). Figure 1 shows UJYALO’s progress towards meeting its targets in June 
2007, three months before the programme came to an end.  
Interventions  
EoP 
Target  
Achievement till 
30th June  
% of Target 
Achieved  
No. of micro-enterprises  15,084  16,770  111%  
No. of productive groups formed and 
strengthened  
865  871  101%  
No. of opportunities for Dalits/youths  150  160  107%  
No.of people getting psycho-social services  26,760  27,186  102%  
No. of people receiving individual counseling  600  891  149%  
No. of people receiving legal aid  400  383  96%  
No. of children provided with educational service  5,300  7,301  138%  
No. of students supported in block grant  49,500  68,602  139%  
No of functioning CPCs formed  121  124  103%  
Number of schools with child protection plan  95  147  155%  
% of community services who are aware of the 
key services available for the VOCs  
90%  89%  99%  
No. of Community Development Programs 
completed  
295  360  122%  
No. of community initiatives implemented  970  1,580  163%  
No. of people trained in peace building skills  11,329  17,260  152%  
No. of people affiliated with peace initiatives  78,000  153,246  196%  
No. of disputes resolved  750  850  113%  
Figure 1: UJYALO Achievements and Progress against targets at 30 June 2007 (Baneshwor, 
2007, p. xi). 
Rwanda – Entrepreneurship and conflict reduction 
A survey conducted in Rwanda suggests that there is a link between entrepreneurial activity in 
Rwanda’s coffee industry, and positive attitudes between ethnic groups. A research team carried 
out questionnaires at ten coffee washing stations (CWS), at which Hutus and Tutsis work 
collaboratively (Datzberger & Denison, 2013, p. 29). The findings of research were that frequent 
contact is associated with low distrust, and with conditional forgiveness. The research also found 
that those who had been employed at CWS for longer periods were more likely to report a 
positive perception of the other ethnic group (Datzberger & Denison, 2013, p. 29). 
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Uganda – Business for Peace (B4P) 
B4P was a Swedish SIDA funded programme implemented by International Alert. It was 
designed to tackle economic drivers of conflict in Uganda. These included weaknesses in the 
economic governance institutions of the country, corruption, and regional, ethnic and religious 
divisions (International Alert, p. 1). 
The theory of change within B4P was that ‘by leveraging the strengths of the private sector to 
influence civil society, government and business communities as a whole, Alert expects to be 
able to influence peace and reconciliation processes in Uganda, which are expected to yield 
results in terms of inclusive economic empowerment, and which, in turn, benefit the growth of the 
private sector itself’ (International Alert, p. 1). 
The programme had four key objectives: (International Alert, p. 2) 
• Provision of analytical leadership on the links between economy and conflict/peace in 
Uganda. 
• Catalysing business for peace networks at the local and national level.  
• Facilitation of efforts to build a peace economy in northern Uganda.  
• Harnessing the potential contribution of oil to peaceful development. 
An in-house evaluation of the programme found that it had an impact at the policy, business 
sector and grassroots levels. Research reportedly contributed to raising awareness of youth-
related issues, and managed to create more linkages between the private sector and decision-
makers. This had a significant impact on national policies. Change in the business community’s 
mindset towards peacebuilding was not universal, but International Alert claims that it had an 
impact by creating a culture of conflict-sensitive business practices (International Alert, p. 2). 
Great Lakes – Trading for Peace 
International Alert 
This project aimed to provide a safe environment for small-scale cross-border traders in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as well as neighbouring Great Lakes countries. Its goal 
was to improve their economic situation and forge closer ties between traders in the region. The 
project trained 300 women traders to better protect their rights and hold customs officials to 
account. It also supported the development and organisation of small trader cooperatives and 
taught negotiation techniques, tax classification and small business management. The project 
also trained border officials to better manage cross-border traders and to treat them better. In 
addition it brought together state agents and traders to voice and address grievances and 
obstacles to trade. The project reportedly resulted in a 60% reduction in cases of harassment at 
the border.1 
                                                   
1 http://www.international-alert.org/projects/5095 
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Search for Common Ground 
This was a 24-month project implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG). The Trading 
for Peace initiative by USAID, DFID, and COMESA supported the project.  
An in-house evaluation of the project found that overall it had a positive impact. Key results were: 
• Increase of trust among and within trans-border communities.  
• Slight reduction in feelings of discrimination experienced by those buying products from 
the other side of the border. The project may have contributed to this effect. 
• The radio component of the project was very successful, especially in the Bukavu area.  
However, the evaluation also found that much work remained to be done to explain policy 
changes to petty traders (SFCG, 2012, pp. 1-2). 
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